In this book Gerald Holton takes an opposing view, illuminating the ways in which the imagination of the scientist functions early in the formation of a new ...

This paper aims to review the empirical and theoretical research on engineering ethics education, by focusing on the challenges reported in the literature. The analysis is conducted at four levels of the engineering education system. First, the individual level is dedicated to findings about teaching practices reported by instructors. Second, the institutional level brings together findings about the implementation and presence of ethics within engineering programmes. Third, the level of policy situates findings about engineering ethics education in the context of (...) accreditation. Finally, there is the level of the culture of engineering education. The multi-level analysis allows us to address some of the limitations of higher education research which tends to focus on individual actors such as instructors or remains focused on the levels of policy and practice without examining the deeper levels of paradigm and purpose guiding them. Our approach links some of the challenges of engineering ethics education with wider debates about its guiding paradigms. The main contribution of the paper is to situate the analysis of the theoretical and empirical findings reported in the literature on engineering ethics education in the context of broader discussions about the purpose of engineering education and the aims of reform programmes. We conclude by putting forward a series of recommendations for a socio-technical oriented reform of engineering education for ethics. (shrink)

Ch. 9, "Blanchot's 'holocaust'", discusses the French thinker's philosophy of the Holocaust.

We discuss some research that has examined approach motivational urges and how this research clarifies the definition of approach motivation. Our research and that of others have raised doubts about the commonly accepted definition of approach motivation, which views it as a positive affective state triggered by positive stimuli. We review evidence that suggests: (a) that approach motivation is occasionally evoked by negative stimuli; (b) that approach motivation may be experienced as a negative state; and (c) that stimuli are unnecessary (...) to evoke approach motivation. (shrink)

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (...) (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers. (shrink)

A defense of Physician-assisted suicide as ethically justifiable, and as legally permissible.

Colleges of business rankings purport to address relative performance on programs such as sustainability. The primary criticism of rankings is that providers have not established reliability or validity of the ranking. This study examines whether The Global 100 sustainability ranking is sufficiently unique to claim that it is based on attributes not used for non-sustainability ranking (divergent validity) and whether it is appropriately related to independent characteristics expected to measure this attribute (convergent validity).

In both theoretical and applied contexts the concept of autonomy has assumed increasing importance in recent normative philosophical discussion. Given various problems to be clarified or resolved the author characterizes the concept by first setting out conditions of adequacy. The author then links the notion of autonomy to the identification and critical reflection of an agent upon his first-order motivations. It is only when a person identifies with the influences that motivate him, assimilates them to himself, that he is autonomous. (...) In addition this process of identification must itself meet certain procedural constraints. (shrink)

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking (...) them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare?interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons? sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti?paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity. (shrink)

It is one of the remarkable and significant consequence of the AIDS epidemic that out of the context of enormous suffering and death there emerged a forceful set of ideas linking the domains of health and human rights. At first, the effort centered on the observation that protecting individuals from discrimination and unwarranted intrusions on liberty were, contrary to previous epidemics, crucial to protecting the public health and interrupting the spread of HIV But in fairly short order, the scope of (...) the health and human rights perspective expanded dramatically to focus on the ways in which the most fundamental social arrangements rendered individuals and communities vulnerable to HIV Racial and ethnic minorities, those who were marginalized, and women were at risk because of their subordinate status. In the face of such an understanding, nothing short of social change could be adequate to the challenge posed by the AIDS epidemic. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Rhetorik wird in der Forschungsliteratur meist als eines der Entgegensetzung und des wechselseitigen Ausschlusses beschrieben. Dabei wird dem überzeitlichen Wahrheitsanspruch der Philosophie die kontextabhängige Wirkungsabsicht der Rhetorik gegenübergestellt. Während Philosophie auf sicheres Wissen und Erkenntnis ziele, gehe es der Rhetorik nicht um Wahrheit, sondern um die bloße Wahrscheinlichkeit und Meinung. Das kann allerdings nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass Philosophie und Rhetorik auf grundsätzliche Weise aufeinander verwiesen bleiben. Denn allein in der Notwendigkeit, ihren Wahrheitsanspruch öffentlich durchsetzen zu (...) müssen und in der Frage nach der adäquaten Wahl der Ausdrucksmittel, muss sich Philosophie notwendig rhetorischer Verfahren bedienen. Entsprechend hinterfragt eine rhetorische informierte Philosophie das intellektualistische Ideal einer transparenten und selbstexplikativen philosophischen Sprache. Sie unterstreicht demgegenüber die Materialität, Literarizität, Performativität und Historizität philosophischen Sprechens. In diesem Sinne zielt das Handbuch Rhetorik und Philosophie auf ein Denken, das sich des paradoxen Verhältnisses von Philosophie und Rhetorik bewusst bleibt. (shrink)

In Respect for Nature Paul W. Taylor argues that there is a moral obligation to respect all living things. I argue that there is no such obligation. Taylor presents three basic premises for his position. The first two are shown to be mistaken but not necessary for Taylor's argument. The third, that being a nonsentient teleological centre of life confers moral significance, while necessary, fails to be rationally compelling. I argue: (1) The relevant concept of teleology as readily applies to (...) inanimate objects as it does to nonsentient life forms. (2) The inanimate–nonsentient distinction (at the relevant molecular level) is founded upon a continuum which offes no basis sufficient to justify The Life Principle. (3) The concept of teleology, as used by Taylor, is too unclear and ill-founded to serve as the basis for a rationally compelling argument. (shrink)

This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.

Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...) intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications. (shrink)

Ce premier volume de La Nuit des Olympica. Essai sur le national cartésianisme (deux livres en quatre tomes) inaugure l'une des plus saines entreprises de la pensée contemporaine : que cesse le mythe Descartes! Finissons-en avec l'imagerie nationale. Suivons René Descartes dans les moments clés de sa vie, ancrons-le dans son époque de reconquête catholique et de consolidation de l'absolutisme. Traquons en ses feintes le premier de ces hommes en qui Nietzsche dénonçait un " prêtre masqué ", le philosophe. Multipliant (...) points de vue et rapprochements, enrichissant le texte de très abondantes notes, souvent surprenantes, l'auteur instruit le procès de cette source vive de la tradition française, rationaliste et spiritualiste, tant avec insolence et humour que dans une écriture aux antipodes de tout académisme. (shrink)

Our paper aims to explore the effectiveness of a constructivist approach to the teaching of engineering ethics through case studies, by putting forward a contextualization of the much discussed case study “Cutting Road Side Trees” [12] in light of the constructivist frame suggested by Jonassen [8]. First, we briefly analyse how the use of case studies for the teaching of engineering ethics eludes the complexity of the engineering professional environment before arguing that constructivism is a learning theory that can help (...) to address this complexity. The final section proposes a constructivist reworking of the case method in a manner that aims to correct the deficiencies identified, followed by a discussion of the results of applying the contextualized exercise to First Year group of engineering students. The key findings reveal that the contextualized scenario enhances, in some respects, students’ understanding of the social dimension of the engineering profession. (shrink)

Scalar utilitarianism, a form of utilitarianism advocated by Alastair Norcross, retains utilitarianism's evaluative commitments while dispensing with utilitarianism's deontic commitments, or its commitment to the existence or significance of moral duties, obligations and requirements. This article disputes the effectiveness of the arguments that have been used to defend scalar utilitarianism. It is contended that Norcross's central ‘Persuasion Argument’ does not succeed, and it is suggested, more positively, that utilitarians cannot easily distance themselves from deontic assessment, just as long as scalar (...) utilitarians admit – as they should do – that utilitarian evaluation generates normative reasons for action.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar?Volume 25, Issue 1GERALD LANG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000295Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar?Volume 25, Issue 1GERALD LANG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar?Volume 25, Issue 1GERALD LANG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

In this article, we examine how affect influences judgment and thought, but also how thought transforms affect. The general thesis is that the nature and impact of affective reactions depends largely on their objects. We view affect as a representation of value, and its consequences as dependent on its object or what it is about. Within a review of relevant literature and a discussion of the nature of emotion, we focus on the role of the object of affect in governing (...) both the nature of emotional reactions and the impact of affect and emotion on cognition and action. Although emotion is always about the here and now, the capacity for abstract thought means that the human here and now includes imagination as well as perception. Indeed, the hopes and fears that dominate human lives often involve things only imagined. (shrink)